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Abstract
Anthrax has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular
criteria of Article 7 on disease proﬁle and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of anthrax to be listed,
Article 9 for the categorisation of anthrax according to disease prevention and control rules as in
Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to anthrax. The assessment has been
performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert
judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective
level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus
was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this
assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, anthrax can
be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The
disease would comply with the criteria as in Sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the
application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1).
The animal species to be listed for anthrax according to Article 8(3) are several species of mammals,
birds and reptiles, and susceptible herbivores and pigs as reservoir.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
The background and Terms of Reference (ToR) as provided by the European Commission for the
present document are reported in Section 1.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology
followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of
Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework (EFSA
AHAW Panel et al., 2017).
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
The interpretation of the ToR is as in Section 1.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology
followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of
Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the AHL framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
The present document reports the results of assessment on anthrax according to the criteria of the
AHL articles as follows:
• Article 7: anthrax proﬁle and impacts
• Article 5: eligibility of anthrax to be listed
• Article 9: categorisation of anthrax according to disease prevention and control rules as in
Annex IV
• Article 8: list of animal species related to anthrax
2. Data and methodologies
The methodology applied in this opinion is described in detail in a dedicated document about the
ad hoc method developed for assessing any animal disease for the listing and categorisation of
diseases within the AHL framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) (Table 1).
3. Assessment
3.1. Assessment according to Article 7 criteria
This section presents the assessment of anthrax according to the Article 7 criteria of the AHL and
related parameters (see Table 2 of the opinion on methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017)), based on
the information contained in the fact-sheet as drafted by the selected disease scientist (see Section 2.1
of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology) and amended by the AHAW Panel.
3.1.1. Article 7(a) Disease Proﬁle
3.1.1.1. Article 7(a)(i) Animal species concerned by the disease
Susceptible animal species
Parameter 1 – Naturally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders)
• Testudines (Testudinidae);
• Aves (Gruidae, Anatidae, Struthionidae);
• Carnivora (Ursidae, Felidae, Mustelidae, Canidae, Procyonidae, Viverridae, Eupleridae, Mephitidae);
• Proboscidea;
• Diprotodontia;
• Perissodactyla (Rhinocerotidae, Equidae);
• Artiodactyla including Bovidae (Bison bison), Cervidae and Suidae;
• Muridae;
• Primates.
Parameter 2 – Naturally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders)
• Bovidae (cattle, sheep, goats);
• Equidae (Equus caballus);
• Suidae;
• Leporidae.
AHL assessment on anthrax
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Parameter 3 – Experimentally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders)
• Blesbok (Damaliscus dorcas phillipsi);
• Mice;
• Rat;
• Monkey.
Parameter 4 – Experimentally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders)
• Rabbit;
• Sheep;
• Goats;
• Cattle;
• Guinea pig;
• Rat;
• Mice.
Reservoir animal species
A carrier state, in the sense of animals harbouring the speciﬁc organisms of a disease without overt
symptoms and being capable of transmitting the infection, has not been demonstrated in anthrax
(WHO, 2008).
3.1.1.2. Article 7(a)(ii) The morbidity and mortality rates of the disease in animal
populations
Morbidity
Parameter 1 – Prevalence/incidence
The following table shows the OIE – World Animal health information database (WAHID) – ofﬁcial
data on the incidence of anthrax in Europe. The data are related to domestic species (cattle, equids,
goats and sheep). The countries which are not listed have no ofﬁcial data. The data relate to the
number of outbreaks and not to the number of individual cases.
Table 1: Number of outbreaks of anthrax in Europe in domestic species (Source: OIE – World
Animal health information database (WAHID) – ofﬁcial data related to domestic species
(cattle, equids, goats and sheep))
Country
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania 16 28 14 14 13 9 40 17 n.d. n.d. n.d.
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
0 0 2 0 10 13 0 1 1 0 n.d
Bulgaria 1 0 0 0 + 0 3 1 1 6 n.d
Croatia 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 n.d
Finland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.d
Macedonia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 n.d
France 3 5 23 23 0 0 0 1 0 0 n.d
Georgia 3 4 7 11 9 19 27 38 21 17 10
Germany 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 n.d
Greece 2 0 4 15 4 4 2 0 0 0 n.d
Hungary 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 7 3 n.d
Italy 1 + 1 0 0 26 3 0 3 1 1
Moldova 2 4 + 0 1 2 1 2 1 3 n.d
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 3 + 1 1 0 0 n.d
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 n.d
Romania 4 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
Serbia 0 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 n.d
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 n.d
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Parameter 2 – Case-morbidity rate (% clinically diseased animals out of infected ones)
Data not available.
Mortality
Parameter 3 – Case-fatality rate
There are no available data regarding individual cases, and the mortality rate in infected animals is
high (95%). It has long been noted that in certain outbreaks a single animal species may show a
higher susceptibility than another species, which is apparently similarly exposed. An inverse
relationship exists between resistance to infection and susceptibility to the toxin complex as reﬂected
in the level of the terminal bacteraemia. For example, cattle appear very prone to natural infection, but
die with a high level of circulating bacteraemia indicative of a relative toxin resistance. There are
regional differences in species incidence, for example in northern New South Wales, sheep and cattle
are affected with equal frequency, but in southern NSW cattle are four times more likely to be affected
than sheep and bovine mortality rates can be 13 times higher. In contrast to herbivores, pigs and
carnivores are highly resistant to anthrax and the ingestion of large numbers of spores, as are found in
infected carcasses, is generally required to induce infection in these species. However, severe
mortalities have been noted in wild dogs, lions, leopards and cheetahs in spite of their innate
resistance. These differences may be explained by the host species occupying different ecological
niches, but those individual animals are not equally at risk due to the different grazing behaviours of the
vector species, availability and density of animals, and the inﬂuence of different climates, and ecologies
(Hugh-Jones and Blackburn, 2009). The variation may also be associated with different host-target
potentials and strain virulence differences. Moreover mortality rates will depend on whether the animals
have been vaccinated or if they have been subjected to antibiotic treatment during infection.
3.1.1.3. Article 7(a)(iii) The zoonotic character of the disease
Presence
Parameter 1 – Report of zoonotic human cases (anywhere)
The role of Bacillus anthracis in causing illness, and its impact on subsistence livestock-keeping
communities and the impact of sudden deaths in their herds and ﬂocks are not, in most areas, given
high priority by policy-makers in developing countries. Anthrax is transmitted by spores in
contaminated soil and can infect humans via contact or consumption of dead animals or animal
products. Contamination of pasture is the source of most animal cases in endemic countries. There are
no ofﬁcial data on cases of human anthrax, because they are extremely rare. In countries in which the
animal anthrax is endemic, it is possible that some humans who are in contact with animals (farmers)
or parts of animal (butchers) can contract anthrax through contact with an infectious dose of spores of
Country
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 n.d
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 n.d
Turkey 100 116 94 76 82 99 135 121 95 71 n.d
Ukraine 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 n.d
UK + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 n.d
+: Disease with an unknown number of outbreaks.
n.d: no data.
Table 2: Mortality rates during anthrax outbreaks, Italy (Fasanella et al., 2007)
Animal Population of area No. (%) dead animals
Cattle  7,000 81 ( 1.15)
Sheep  20,000 15 ( 0.075)
Goats  13,000 9 ( 0.069)
Horses  600 11 ( 1.83)
Red deer 45 8 ( 17.77)
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Bacillus anthracis, but it is a very rare event. In animals, the disease is almost always fatal (95%
mortality rate), and vaccination is the only realistic basis for effective control. Man is usually resistant
to acquiring infection, but when infected he may show three different clinical forms: the cutaneous,
the respiratory and the intestinal form.
The cutaneous form begins with the formation of classic malignant pustules, most often localised
on face, neck, arms, hands or legs. Most frequently infection results from exposure through speciﬁc
high-risk occupations; that is, farmers, butchers, tanners, wool carders, shearers and veterinarians.
The most common exposure comes from skinning and butchering cattle which were either sick, or had
died from anthrax. At the point of entry of the B. anthracis, through a pre-existing scratch, there is
ﬁrstly a skin redness, which then turns into a papule. Characteristically, this lesion area is not painful.
The surrounding area appears to be hyperaemic and oedematous. The papule develops into vesicles
that break spontaneously, or as a result of scratching, and, eventually, the site of the lesion becomes
covered with a black eschar or scab. Sometimes, the regional lymph nodes can be involved. Cutaneous
anthrax is easily treatable with appropriate antibiotics, but if a pustule is neglected it may result in
systemic disease through septicaemia, which can result in fatalities. Some 10% of untreated cutaneous
cases may die.
Intestinal anthrax results from the consumption of contaminated meat. Its symptoms include
nausea, loss of appetite, vomiting and fever followed by abdominal pain, vomiting of blood, severe
diarrhoea, lesions and soreness in the throat, difﬁculty in swallowing and marked swelling of the neck
and regional lymph nodes. Intestinal anthrax results in death in 25–60% of cases. The intestinal form
occurs less frequently and occurs in those developing countries where food safety controls measures
are de facto non-existent or less well developed. Thorough cooking will kill the vegetative cells and
prior exposure to B. anthracis does provide some immunity, so the rate of disease development in any
case of exposure is variable.
The respiratory or pulmonary form is a cause of an atypical haemorrhagic pneumonia –
starting with ﬂu-like symptoms, characterised by fever, muscle pains, coughing, red nose and bloody
sputum. Untreated cases are usually fatal. A study of several conﬁrmed cases of inhalational anthrax
caused by an intentional release of B. anthracis in the United States showed that the median
incubation period from the time of exposure to onset of symptoms was 4 days (range: 4–6 days).
Symptoms at initial presentation included fever or chills, sweats, fatigue or malaise, a minimal or
non-productive cough, dyspnoea and nausea or vomiting. All 10 patients had abnormal chest X-rays;
visible abnormalities in x-ray studies showed inﬁltrates, pleural effusion and mediastinal widening.
Computer tomography of the chest was performed on eight patients, and mediastinal lymphadenopathy
was present in seven. Forty-one cases of documented inhalational anthrax from the Sverdlovsk epidemic
of 1979 showed that the lesions that were the most severe and apparently of the longest duration were
in the mediastinal lymph nodes and mediastinum. There and elsewhere, peripheral transudate
surrounded a ﬁbrin-rich oedema; necrosis of arteries and veins was the most likely source of large
haemorrhages displacing tissue or inﬁltrating tissues, respectively; and apoptosis (destruction) of
lymphocytes was observed. Respiratory function was compromised by mediastinal expansion, and by
signiﬁcant amounts of pleural effusion and haematogenous and retrograde lymphatic vessel spread of
B. anthracis into the lungs with consequent pneumonia. The central nervous system and intestines
manifested similar haematogenous spread, vasculitis, haemorrhages and oedema (WHO, 2008).
3.1.1.4. Article 7(a)(iv) The resistance to treatments, including antimicrobial resistance
Parameter 1 – Resistant strain to any treatment even at laboratory level
Anthrax has been considered a potential biological weapon for at least 60 years. Prevention of
anthrax infection relies on serial vaccinations and prolonged antibiotic treatment against the infection.
Owing to limited global availability of the anthrax vaccine, most treatment strategies utilise antibiotics.
Penicillin G, doxycycline and ciproﬂoxacin have been for long time the chosen drugs (recommended by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA))
for ﬁrst-line treatment of all forms of anthrax disease in humans. Combinations of these drugs were
used to treat the recent US cases; yet, historically, penicillin has been the antimicrobial agent most
commonly used for treating anthrax worldwide. The emergence of natural antibiotic resistance is a
global phenomenon that is on the increase and is partially related to long-term antibiotic therapy (for
60 days or more). While there have been no reports of naturally occurring ciproﬂoxacin- or
doxycycline-resistant B. anthracis strains, naturally occurring penicillin G-resistant B. anthracis isolates
have been reported in the literature (Bradaric and Pundapolic, 1992; Lalitha and Thomas, 1997). Tests
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of 50 historical B. anthracis isolates and 15 isolates from the recent human anthrax cases in the United
States indicate widespread susceptibility to b-lactam-containing compounds with one exception. Out of
the 65 strains tested, one strain, isolated from a human case of anthrax in 1974, was b-lactamase
positive and penicillin resistant. In another survey, 7 out of 44 isolates from carcasses and soil derived
from a region of South Africa in which anthrax was endemic were resistant to penicillin G (Odendaal
et al., 1991). A third survey of isolates recovered in France, including 1 isolate from a human, 28 from
animal sources, and 67 from other environmental sources, revealed resistance to penicillin G and
amoxicillin in 11.5% of the isolates (Cavallo et al., 2002). Bacterial resistance to b-lactam antibiotics is
most commonly attributed to the synthesis of b-lactamases, which are enzymes that hydrolyse amides,
amidines, and other carbon–nitrogen bonds in cyclic amides. The mechanism underlying b-lactam
resistance is due to the presence of two b -lactamases genes, bla1 and bla2, with bla1 being a
penicillinase and conferring high-level resistance to ampicillin, amoxicillin and penicillin G, while bla2 is
a cephalosporinase conferring low-level resistance to ceftriaxone, cefazolin, cefoxitin and cefotetan
(Athamna et al., 2004). Furthermore, in vitro studies have shown that B. anthracis strains, isolates
found from locations diverse in time, space, and genotype – can all develop resistance to a wide range
of antibiotics – including ciproﬂoxacin, doxycycline and b-lactam antibiotics, and also levoﬂoxacin,
gatiﬂoxacin, tetracycline, trimethoprim, linezolid, chloramphenicol, rifampicin and clindamycin. The
mechanism of resistance of B. anthracis has not been fully explored. However, it is known that strains
that are ﬂuoroquinolone resistant, owe this resistance to the development of mutations in gyrA, parC
and gyrB as have been described by Price et al. (2003).
3.1.1.5. Article 7(a)(v) The persistence of the disease in an animal population or the
environment
Animal population
Parameter 1 – Duration of infectious period in animals
Anthrax in animals usually shows a rapid progression with a fatal outcome. Clinical signs of the
disease in herbivores are visible only within a few hours before death. The incubation period for
anthrax in susceptible laboratory animals normally ranges between about 36 and 72 h regardless of
the route of infection (Beyer and Turnbull, 2009). The range of incubation period appears to be wider
in susceptible livestock and, for the purposes of trade restrictions, OIE speciﬁes a period of 20 days
(OIE, online). The ﬁrst sign of anthrax in a herd or ﬂock is usually the sudden death of one or more of
the animals. On close observation, affected animals become distressed during the ﬁnal systemic phase
of infection. Swellings in the submandibular fossa may be apparent and body temperatures may rise.
The systemic phase in susceptible animals may only last a few hours and the animal ﬁnally becomes
comatose and dies; these events may take longer in immunised animals or in more resistant species,
attributable to lower terminal bacteraemia and reduced levels of circulating toxin in such animals.
The only clinical symptom, which is usually detectable one or 2 days before death, is pyrexia (a fever).
The carcasses of animals dying from anthrax are reservoirs of spores. The spores which pass from the
carcasses to the soil are very durable and can remain quiescent and viable for many years.
Parameter 2 – Presence and duration of latent infection period
Anthrax is a severe acute disease. Instances of carrier state, prolonged incubation or chronic
infection have been reported, but appear to be rare and unusual (WHO, 2008). Experimental studies in
monkeys and laboratory mice aimed at improved understanding of inhalation anthrax have shown that
inhaled spores may lie dormant in the lung of monkeys for weeks before being cleared by alveolar
macrophages, showing no evidence of germination until they are within the macrophages (Barnes,
1947; Henderson et al., 1956; Widdicombe et al., 1956; Ross, 1957; Friedlander et al., 1993). Insects
could be vehicles for spores of anthrax spores. Insects (such as horse ﬂies) are considered passive
carriers and do not establish any direct relation to the B. anthracis (Hugh-Jones and Blackburn, 2009).
Parameter 3 – Presence and duration of the pathogen in healthy carriers
See Section 3.1.1.4 Parameter 2.
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Environment
Parameter 4 – Length of survival of the agent and/or detection of DNA in selected matrices (soil,
water, air) from the environment (scenarios: high and low T)
Soil stained with terminally haemorrhaged blood and with non-haemorrhagic ﬂuids exhibited high
levels of B. anthracis spore contamination (ranging from 103 to 108 spores/g (Bellan et al., 2013)).
The ecological and genetic factors that govern the persistence of anthrax reservoirs in the
environment are still obscure (Schuch and Fischetti, 2009). There is a need for additional research
on the conditions that favour B. anthracis survival in soil, e.g. to study whether B. anthracis undergoes
a growth cycle in soil, or investigate the potential for transfer of B. anthracis virulence genes to
other soil microorganisms (Pepper and Gentry, 2002). For example, Dey et al. (2012) demonstrated
that under simulated environmental conditions amoebas can contribute to the ampliﬁcation of
B. anthracis.
In many parts of the world, the B. anthracis is endemic in soils, where it causes sporadic disease in
livestock. These soils are typically rich in organic matter and calcium that promote survival of resilient
B. anthracis spores. Outbreaks of anthrax tend to occur in warm weather following rains that are
believed to concentrate spores in low-lying areas where runoff collect (Dey et al., 2012).
It has been reported that anthrax spores have survived in dry soil for 60 years (Wilson and Russell,
1964). The longest survival claim is probably the one on regarding anthrax spores from bones
retrieved during archaeological excavations at a site in the Kruger National Park, South Africa, that
were estimated by carbon-dating to be 200  50 years old (De Vos, 1990). The data from annual
sampling between 1946 and 1969 of a contaminated site on Gruinard Island, Scotland (where an
estimated 4 9 1014 spores were dispersed by explosive means in 1942 and 1943 during the Second
World War) predicted to decay until undetectable by 2050 (Manchee et al., 1990).
Environmental isolates of B. anthracis from sites with a history of anthrax spore contamination in
the distant past quite frequently lacked the pXO2 DNA plasmid and, less frequently, both pXO1 and
pXO2 DNA plasmids. It is hypothesised that, under ‘stressful environmental conditions’ such as within
sewage or in the harsh semidesert circumstances (such as those found in the Etosha National Park in
Namibia for example) B. anthracis could spontaneously lose one or both virulence plasmids (WHO,
2008).When ﬁrst cultured, the isolates were a mixture of capsulating and non-capsulating cells,
possibly representing a population in the transition stage. However, the precise causes and events
responsible for the loss of one or other of the plasmids and the time or times during the germination,
outgrowth, multiplication and resporulation at which these events occur is not known (Turnbull et al.,
1992).
3.1.1.6. Article 7(a)(vi) The routes and speed of transmission of the disease between
animals, and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Routes of transmission
Parameter 1 – Types of routes of transmission from animal to animal (horizontal, vertical)
Anthrax does not typically spread from animal to animal or from person to person. The typical
route of infection in animals is grazing on soils contaminated with spores of B. anthracis.
Parameter 2 - Type of routes of transmission between animals and humans (direct, indirect, including
food-borne)
Humans can become infected by eating meat from infected animals or manipulating animal
products such as hides, hair, wool or bones that could contain anthrax spores.
Speed of transmission
Parameter 3 – Incidence between animals and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Transmission from animals to humans depends on the social conditions of the country in which
outbreaks of anthrax occurred. In developed countries, it is very rare that animal anthrax outbreaks
involve humans, and usually the infection to humans occurs during the slaughter of infected animals.
The result is that the ratio of animal/human cases is in favour of animals cases. In poor or developing
countries, slaughtering animals during the pre-agonic phase of the disease (before the animal shows
full clinical symptoms) can occur and result in the sale of infected meat. This can lead the opposite
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situation to that above (many human cases from few animals cases), if the infected meat is sold to a
large number of consumers (Fasanella et al., 2013b).
Parameter 4 – Transmission rate (beta) (from R0 and infectious period) between animals and, when
relevant, between animals and humans
Data is not available.
3.1.1.7. Article 7(a)(vii) The absence or presence and distribution of the disease in the
Union, and, where the disease is not present in the Union, the risk of its
introduction into the Union
Presence and distribution
Parameter 1 – Map where the disease is present in EU
See Table 1.
Parameter 2 – Types of epidemiological occurrence (sporadic, epidemic, endemic) at MS level
The epidemiological occurrence of anthrax depends on the country. In some countries, the disease
is absent or seen only sporadically (for example in Italy and Greece). In other countries, anthrax is
endemic (for example, Albania, Georgia, Turkey). In the countries in which the disease is present,
epidemics are a possibility, and recently, it has been proposed that there are three different types of
outbreaks (Fasanella et al., 2014). The ﬁrst is a classic sporadic outbreak. This form occurs in areas
where anthrax is enzootic and infection takes place because of contaminated pastures. These
outbreaks are sporadic and usually involve initially only 1–3 animals. The second type is an atypical
outbreak and this form is associated with the use of forages (e.g. hay, silage) produced on
contaminated land or with products of animal origin such as inadequately sterilised meat and bone
meals derived from the infected carcasses. The third type is an epidemic outbreak and this form is an
evolution of the classic sporadic form due to the activities of Haematophagus ﬂies. Tabanid ﬂies
feeding on moribund animals, especially during the bacteraemic phase, are able to transfer the
pathogen to healthy animals in the same or neighbouring herds or ﬂocks, causing a disease
characterised by extensive oedema.
Risk of introduction
Infection is already present in Member States (MSs).
3.1.1.8. Article 7(a)(viii) The existence of diagnostic and disease control tools
Diagnostic tools
Parameter 1 – Existence of diagnostic tools
As described in ‘Anthrax in Humans and Animals, 4th Edition’ (WHO, 2008), several techniques can
be used for the diagnosis of anthrax. With regard to the conﬁrmation of bacterial species, after
isolation of bacteria from sample, it is necessary overnight incubation at 35–37°C on horse or sheep
blood agar (BA). Colonies of B. anthracis are white or grey–white and non-haemolytic, 2–4 mm in
diameter, with a slightly moist, matt appearance. Use of selective media for the isolation of
B. anthracis, like polymyxin lysozyme EDTA thallous acetate (PLET)_agar and trimethoprim
sulfamethoxazole methanol polymyxin (TSMP) in blood agar may facilitate growth; the latter can be
useful to discriminate haemolytic colonies from non-haemolytic. After bacterial DNA extraction,
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for pag and cap genes may be used for species conﬁrmation. After
isolation of bacteria from sample, also the matrix assisted laser desorption ionization-time of ﬂight
(MALDI TOF) technique may also be used in order to identify the species (Lasch et al., 2009).
Regarding serological tests, two types of serological assays, an anti-protective antigen (PA)
immunoglobulin G (IgG) enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and the anthrax toxin
neutralising assay (TNA) can be used to determine the antibody levels (Pitt et al., 1999).
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Control tools
Parameter 2 – Existence of control tools
Animal anthrax has a rapid disease progression, in most cases with a fatal outcome, so it is quite
difﬁcult to implement control measures. However, control could be performed by vaccinating
susceptible animals and carrying out a movement control of animals. Another control tool is the
execution of the biosecurity measures in case of outbreak (Fasanella et al., 2014). As regards the
control of the environment in areas known to be contaminated, the Ground Anthrax Bacillus Reﬁned
Isolation (GABRI) method (Fasanella et al., 2013a) is an useful technique for the detection and
quantiﬁcation of anthrax spores in the soil, especially in proximity of the burial sites.
3.1.2. Article 7(b) The impact of diseases
3.1.2.1. Article 7(b)(i) The impact of the disease on agricultural and aquaculture
production and other parts of the economy
The level of presence of the disease in the Union
Parameter 1 – Number of MSs where the disease is present
See Table 1.
The loss of production due to the disease
Parameter 2 – Proportion of production losses (%) by epidemic/endemic situation
There are no ofﬁcial data but considering the few cases of animal anthrax and considering the few
dead animals, the proportion of production losses can be estimated as low.
3.1.2.2. Article 7(b)(ii) The impact of the disease on human health
Transmissibility between animals and humans
Parameter 1 – Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans
Contact with infected meat, ingestion of infected meat, contact with parts of animal which died
because of anthrax, contact with live animals which are infected.
Parameter 2 – Incidence of zoonotic cases
Cases of human anthrax are rare; however, they can occur in countries where the animal anthrax is
endemic.
Transmissibility between humans
Parameter 3 – Human to human transmission is sufﬁcient to sustain sporadic cases or community-level
outbreak
No.
Parameter 4 – Sporadic, endemic, epidemic, or pandemic potential
Possible epidemic case only in the case of deliberate release of anthrax spores in the environment
(bioterrorism).
The severity of human forms of the disease
Parameter 5 – Disability-adjusted life year (DALY)
Data not available
The availability of effective prevention or medical treatment in humans
Parameter 6 – Availability of medical treatment and their effectiveness (therapeutic effect and any
resistance)
The approach to prevention and treatment of anthrax differs from that applied for other bacterial
infections. The production of toxin, potential for antimicrobial drug resistance, frequent occurrence of
meningitis, and presence of latent spores must be taken into account when selecting post-exposure
prophylaxis (PEP). A combination of antimicrobial drugs for treatment of anthrax is more likely to be
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curative than antimicrobial drug monotherapy. There is also a theoretical beneﬁt for combined use of
bactericidal and protein synthesis inhibitor agents. Bactericidal agents can have an immediate killing
effect. However, the high rates of illness and death seen with anthrax are caused, in part, by
B. anthracis exotoxin production. In vitro toxin production is inhibited earlier by protein synthesis
inhibitors earlier than by bactericidal agents. Patients hospitalised for systemic anthrax should be
immediately treated with a combination of broad-spectrum intravenous antimicrobial drug treatment
pending conﬁrmatory test results because any delay may prove fatal. After treatment, uncomplicated
cutaneous anthrax has a mortality rate of < 2%. However, even with antimicrobial drug treatment and
modern critical care, injection, gastrointestinal, and inhalation anthrax have mortality rates of 28%,
≥ 40%, and 45%, respectively. Anthrax meningitis is nearly always fatal, even with treatment. The
CDC issued updated guidelines on anthrax PEP and treatment in non-pregnant and pregnant adults
(Meaney-Delman et al., 2014). Recommendations include the following:
• All individuals exposed to aerosolised B. anthracis spores should receive a full 60 days of PEP
antimicrobial drugs, regardless of their vaccination status;
• Ciproﬂoxacin, levoﬂoxacin and doxycycline are approved by the FDA for PEP for inhalation
anthrax in adults aged 18 years or older; ciproﬂoxacin and doxycycline are ﬁrst-line
treatments. Alternative antimicrobial drugs that might be used for PEP if ﬁrst-line agents are
not tolerated or are unavailable include levoﬂoxacin and moxiﬂoxacin; amoxicillin and penicillin
VK if the isolate is penicillin susceptible; and clindamycin. The antimicrobial drug linezolid
cannot be used for extended periods. Also, the risk for development of resistance must be
kept in mind if using b-lactam drugs;
• Treatment for anthrax meningitis should include at least three antimicrobial drugs with activity
against B. anthracis, at least one of which should have bactericidal activity, and at least one of
which should be a protein synthesis inhibitor. For patients suspected to have systemic anthrax,
antitoxin should be added to combination antimicrobial drug treatment;
• Uncomplicated cutaneous anthrax can be treated with a single oral agent; ﬂuoroquinolones
(ciproﬂoxacin, levoﬂoxacin and moxiﬂoxacin) and doxycycline are equivalent ﬁrst-line drugs;
• Treatments for pregnant, post-partum and lactating women are generally the same as those
for non-pregnant patients.
Parameter 7 – Availability of vaccines and their effectiveness (reduced morbidity)
The two main types of anthrax vaccine for human use are indicated for active immunisation for the
prevention of disease caused by B. anthracis, in persons 18–65 years of age at high risk of exposure.
The vaccines are prepared from a cell-free ﬁltrate of B. anthracis that contains antigenic proteins,
which are adsorbed or precipitated using an aluminium-based adjuvant. The principal active ingredient
is the protective antigen (PA) component of the anthrax toxin complex. These vaccines include Anthrax
Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) and Anthrax Vaccine Precipitated (AVP).
• AVA, adsorbed onto aluminium hydroxide, was ﬁrst licensed in the USA in 1972 and is
administered intramuscularly in ﬁve doses over a period of 18 months (Wright et al., 2010). The
strain used to prepare the vaccine is a toxigenic, non-encapsulated strain known as V770-NPI-R.
• AVP, precipitated onto aluminium potassium phosphate, was ﬁrst licensed in the UK in 1979
and is administered intramuscularly in four doses over a period of 8 months (32 weeks). The
strain used to prepare the vaccine is a Sterne strain 34F2.
(WHO, 2012a,b)
3.1.2.3. Article 7(b)(iii) The impact of the disease on animal welfare
Parameter 1 – Severity of clinical signs at case level and related level and duration of impairment
The symptomatology changes depending to the species. In bovine anthrax, may be hyperacute or
acute. In the hyperacute form, animals are frequently found dead without the owner noting any
obvious premonitory signs. This usually occurs at the beginning of an outbreak. In animals where
clinical signs are observed, this will include fever, wheezing, congestion of mucous, muscle tremors and
convulsions. In the acute form, the disease is characterised by septicaemia, high fever (41–42°C),
tachypnoea, and congested and haemorrhagic mucous membranes. Initially, the animal may be
excited, but this is followed by major depression. In sheep, the fulminant form is most common: the
animals can die in a few minutes with convulsions. In equines, the disease develops with colic
syndrome and septicaemia associated with muscle tremors, sensory depression, a very high fever,
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cyanosis, tachypnoea and tachycardia. Pigs are more resistant and the disease is usually subclinical
(Smith, 1973). The carnivores are fairly resistant, but if affected they show signs of acute
gastroenteritis and oropharyngitis, which is due to ingestion of large volumes of infected meat
(Fasanella et al., 2010).
3.1.2.4. Article 7(b)(iv) The impact of the disease on biodiversity and the environment
Biodiversity
Parameter 1 – Endangered wild species affected: listed species as in CITES and/or IUCN list
All species related to the Orders/Families mentioned in Section 3.1.1.1 ‘Susceptible animal species’
could become infected.
Parameter 2 – Mortality in wild species
The mortality is high (> 95%) in herbivores and low in carnivores because serological evidence seems
to indicate that naturally acquired anthrax antibodies are rare in herbivores but common in carnivores
(Hugh-Jones and de Vos, 2002). In the wild, anthrax does not affect all herbivorous species equally, and
there is an apparent susceptibility to the disease for particular species in some regions. Zebras, for
example, are the most commonly affected in the Etosha National Park in northern Namibia, with kudu
only occasionally affected – with 45% of recorded cases being in zebra vs 0.8% for kudu (Lindeque and
Turnbull, 1994). In the Kruger National Park, South Africa, the kudu is the principal host, accounting for
> 50% of all recorded anthrax cases (De Vos, 1990). Grazing, browsing and ﬂies are the main variables in
these different regions; ﬂies are the vectors of spores from dead carcasses to foliage in some vicinities. In
Texas, goats and white-tailed deer frequent the same areas but, if horseﬂies are transmitters of the
disease, they fail to infect the goats. In Europe, there is only limited data (Hugh-Jones, 2004).
Environment
Parameter 3 – Capacity of the pathogen to persist in the environment and cause mortality in wildlife
One of the major characteristics of B. anthracis spores is to be very persistent in the environment,
and it is evident that the spores can remain viable in soil up to hundreds of years. Anthrax spores
survive best in black steppe soils rich in organic matter and calcium. The persistence of spores in the
soil exposes grazing animals at higher risk of anthrax. The major source of spores in the soil is the
presence of material from infected carcasses.
3.1.3. Article 7(c) Its potential to generate a crisis situation and its potential use
in bioterrorism
Bioterrorism can be deﬁned as the deliberate release of pathogenic microorganisms or parts
thereof, in order to cause panic, terror, death or illness in the population, for political, religious or
economic claims. From a strictly academic perspective, this kind of terrorism appears a derivative of a
real biological warfare: both use the same weapons, but with different purposes, methods of
dissemination and means. The biological weapon is based on the use of biological aggressive, that is,
the microorganisms and chemical substances produced from these ones (toxins), capable of inducing a
state of disease in humans, animals or plants and/or cause the deterioration of the materials that can
be used for military purposes for their biological and technical characteristics. Anthrax has many of the
requirements to be qualiﬁed as an agent for potential bioterrorist use:
(1) virulence adequate to the intended use; (2) low minimal microbial charge; (3) low median lethal
dose; (4) period of incubation known and adapted to the intended use; (5) high storage stability; (6)
adequate persistence to the intended use; (7) difﬁculty of detection/identiﬁcation; (8) ease of
production in signiﬁcant quantities; (9) ease of dissemination; (10) controllability, by the attacker, of
the spread of the disease; (11) little or no sensitivity to known pharmacological and immunological
treatment and prophylaxis. The B. anthracis spores represent one of the most advanced forms of
resistance in nature. In the form of spore, Bacillus can survive outdoors for many years. For its ease of
production and for the fact that the spores are well preserved without the need of having to resort to
any type of particular form of protection, B. anthracis has been studied for its potential use as a
bacteriological weapon of mass destruction. Although it has recently been revealed that the Russian
programme on biological weapons included anthrax genetically not modiﬁed (Sahl et al., 2016), it is
suspected that spore manipulations were carried out to make them more volatile and favour the air
ﬂotation time in order to have a greater chance of being inspired by the people. There were two
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incidents of bioterrorism where anthrax was used. The ﬁrst occurred in Tokyo in the 1990s by the
religious sect Aum Shinrikyo that had produced anthrax and had sprayed it in a restricted area of the
city. Fortunately, this incident had no consequences simply because the strain used for the attack was
the vaccination one. Dramatically famous is instead the episode of 2001, which occurred in the United
States and related to the epidemic of cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax caused by the delivery of
letters containing anthrax spores in Florida and in Washington. According to ofﬁcial ﬁgures of the time,
22 people (but 68 according to recent studies) were affected by spores in the letters, and ﬁve of them
died. The anthrax Ames strain, responsible for the morbid forms, was the same used in various military
labs and production sites of biological weapons in the United States prior to their disposal, which took
place unilaterally in the late sixties. The destructive potential was huge, just think that one gram of
spores contained 10 9 1012 spores and that the lethal dose for humans is 8,000–10,000 spores.
Parameter 1 – Listed in OIE/CFSPH classiﬁcation of pathogens
It is listed.
Parameter 2 - Listed in the Encyclopaedia of Bioterrorism Defence of Australia Group
It is listed.
Parameter 3 - Included in any other list of potential bio- agro-terrorism agents
It is listed.
3.1.4. Article 7(d) The feasibility, availability and effectiveness of the following
disease prevention and control measures
3.1.4.1. Article 7(d)(i) Diagnostic tools and capacities
Availability
Parameter 1 – Ofﬁcially/internationally recognised diagnostic tool, OIE certiﬁed
Diagnostic techniques which are OIE certiﬁed are described in Manual of Diagnostic Tests and
Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2016 (OIE, 2012). With regard to identiﬁcation of the agent, OIE
suggests isolation of the bacterial agent from fresh specimens through growing of agent on horse or
sheep blood agar. After overnight incubation at 37°C, B. anthracis colonies are grey–white to white,
0.3–0.5 cm in diameter, non-haemolytic, with a ground-glass surface and very tacky when teased with
an inoculating loop. Two more tests described by OIE for conﬁrming the identity of B. anthracis are
gamma phage lysis and penicillin susceptibility. Regarding the immunological detection, the OIE
suggests Ascoli test (Ascoli, 1911), while some success has been achieved with immunoﬂuorescence
for capsule observation in the research situation (Ezzell and Abshire, 1996). Conﬁrmation of virulence
can be carried out using PCR (WHO, 2008).
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Se and Sp of diagnostic test
Microbiological tests allow for the isolation and identiﬁcation of B. anthracis with high sensitivity and
speciﬁcity, but to be sure of the result, it is always necessary to perform biomolecular analysis.
Feasibility
Microbiological test, biomolecular test and serological test are sold by many companies.
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Parameter 3 – Type of sample matrix to be tested (blood, tissue, etc.)
See Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Table 3: Blood or tissues samples from fresh anthrax-infected carcasses
Tested material: Blood or tissues from fresh anthrax-infected carcasses
Direct microscopy
analysis on samples
Isolation procedures Conﬁrmatory tests on isolated colonies
Treatment
of material
for isolation
of B. anthracis
Culture media
Microscopy
analysis
Gamma
phage lysis
and penicillin
susceptibility
Speciﬁc
PCR for
chromosome,
pXO1 and
pXO2
plasmids
Polychrome
methylene blue –
McFadyean’s
reaction
The capsule of virulent
encapsulated
B. anthracis stains pink,
whereas the bacillus
cells stain dark blue
However, if the animal
has been dead more
than 24 h, the capsule
may be difﬁcult to
detect. Gram and
Giemsa stains do not
reveal the capsule
No treatment is
required
Blood agar
PLET TMSP
5% sheep
blood agar
Colonies are
grey–white to
white, 0.3–0.5
cm in diameter,
non-haemolytic,
with a ground-
glass surface,
and very tacky
when teased
with an
inoculating loop
Polychrome
methylene blue.
Gram staining
Conﬁrmation of
B. anthracis
should be
accomplished by
the demonstration
of a capsulated,
spore-forming,
Gram-positive rod
in blood culture.
The absence of
motility is an
additional test
that can be done
Indicative but
not deﬁnitive
Deﬁnitive
diagnosis
PCR: polymerase chain reaction; PLET: polymyxin lysozyme EDTA thallous acetate; TSMP: trimethoprim sulfamethoxazole
methanol polymyxin.
Table 4: Bone meal, hides and turbinate of old decomposed carcasses samples of B. anthracis
Tested material: Bone meal, hides, turbinate of old decomposed carcasses
Direct
microscopy
analysis on
samples
Isolation procedures Conﬁrmatory tests on isolated colonies
Treatment of
material for
isolation of
B. anthracis
Culture media
Microscopy
analysis
Gamma
phage lysis
and penicillin
susceptibility
Speciﬁc
PCR for
chromosome,
pXO1 and
pXO2
plasmids
Not
applicable
Heat treatment
To reduce
environmental
contaminants the
sample is blended
in two volumes of
sterile distilled or
deionised water or
a 0.1% of a Tween
20 water solution.
Washed for 20 min
and then placed in
a water bath at
62.5  0.5°C for
30–60 min
PLET
TMSP 5% sheep blood
agar
Colonies are grey-white to
white, 0.3–0.5 cm in
diameter, non-haemolytic,
with a ground-glass surface,
and very tacky when teased
with an inoculating loop.
The 5% sheep blood agar is
not recommended because
the absence of antibiotic can
promotes the growth of
Gram-negative
contaminants
Polychrome
methylene blue
Gram staining
Conﬁrmation of
B. anthracis should
be accomplished
by the
demonstration of a
capsulated, spore-
forming, Gram-
positive rod in
blood culture. The
absence of motility
is an additional test
that can be done
Indicative but
not deﬁnitive
Deﬁnitive
diagnosis
PCR: polymerase chain reaction; PLET: polymyxin lysozyme EDTA thallous acetate; TSMP: trimethoprim sulfamethoxazole
methanol polymyxin.
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3.1.4.2. Article 7(d)(ii) Vaccination
Availability
Parameter 1 – Types of vaccines available on the market (live, inactivated, DIVA, etc.)
Vaccine: Live Spore Sterne Vaccine.
Strain: B. anthracis Sterne 34 F2.
Quality characteristic of Sterne strain: acapsulated toxigenic.
Genetic characteristic of Sterne strain: pX01+/pX02-.
Vaccine formulation: live spores suspended in glycerol with saponin of only saponin added as an
adjuvant.
Production Manufactured in accordance with the Requirements for anthrax spore vaccine (live for
veterinary use), Requirements for biological substances No. 13 (WHO, 1967), the Manual for the
production of anthrax and blackleg vaccines (FAO, 1991) and the Manual of diagnostic tests and
vaccines for terrestrial animals (OIE, 2012).
General recommendations: animals being vaccinated should not receive antibiotics for several
(7–10) days before or after vaccination. The vaccine may be rendered ineffective, for example, in
cattle on antibiotics for growth promotion or receiving anti-mastitis therapy. Concerns that antibiotics
may have interfered with vaccine efﬁcacy, the animals may be revaccinated after a period of 2 weeks.
Parameter 2 – Availability/production capacity (per year)
Data not available for European Community (in Italy the production is on average 100,000 doses).
Effectiveness
Parameter 3 – Field protection as reduced morbidity (as reduced susceptibility to infection and/or to
disease)
Experimentation has shown that the monovalent rPA vaccine (rPA) and trivalent vaccine (TV,
containing rPA and two inactive mutants of LF and EF) protected 100% of rabbits challenged with
Table 5: Environmental samples of B. anthracis
Tested material: Environmental samples
Direct
microscopy
analysis on
samples
Isolation procedures Conﬁrmatory tests on isolated colonies
Treatment of
material for
isolation of
B. anthracis
Culture media
Microscopy
analysis
Gamma
phage lysis
and penicillin
susceptibility
Speciﬁc
PCR for
chromosome,
pXO1 and
pXO2 plasmids
Not
applicable
Heat treatment
To reduce
environmental
contaminants the
sample is blended in
two volumes of
sterile distilled or
deionised water or a
0.1% of a tween 20
water solution.
Washed for 20 min
and after a short
sedimentation
remove the
supernatant. Then
placed in a water
bath at 62.5  0.5°C
for 30–60 min
PLET
TMSP 5% sheep
blood agar
Colonies are
grey–white to white,
0.3–0.5 cm in
diameter, non-
haemolytic, with a
ground-glass surface,
and very tacky when
teased with an
inoculating loop. The
5% sheep blood agar
is not recommended
because the absence
of antibiotic can
promote the growth
of Gram-negative
contaminants
Polychrome
methylene blue
Gram staining
Conﬁrmation of
B. anthracis
should be
accomplished
by the
demonstration of
a capsulated,
spore-forming,
Gram-positive rod
in blood culture.
The absence of
motility is an
additional test
that can be done
Indicative but
not deﬁnitive
Deﬁnitive
diagnosis
PCR: polymerase chain reaction; PLET: polymyxin lysozyme EDTA thallous acetate; TSMP: trimethoprim sulfamethoxazole
methanol polymyxin.
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200LD50 of the virulent strain B. anthracis 0843 1 week later the vaccination. The same work has
shown that the vaccine Sterne protected 80% of rabbits 1 week after the vaccination (Fasanella et al.,
2008).
Parameter 4 – Duration of protection
From 6 months to 1 year.
Feasibility
Parameter 5 – Way of administration
Subcutaneous to intramuscular.
3.1.4.3. Article 7(d)(iii) Medical treatments
Availability
Parameter 1 – Types of drugs available on the market
In humans (Table 6):
In animals:
Early treatment and vigorous implementation of a preventive program (annual vaccination)
are essential to reduce losses among livestock. Livestock at risk should be immediately treated with
a long-acting antibiotic to stop all potential incubating infections. This is followed by vaccination
~ 7–10 days after antibiotic treatment. Any animals becoming sick after initial treatment and/or
vaccination should be retreated immediately and revaccinated a month later. Simultaneous use of
antibiotics and vaccine is inappropriate, because available commercial vaccines for animals are live
vaccines. Animals should be moved to another pasture away from where the bodies had lain and any
possible soil contamination. Suspected contaminated feed should be immediately removed. Domestic
livestock respond well to penicillin if treated in the early stages of the disease. Oxytetracycline given
daily in divided doses also is effective. Other antibacterials, including amoxicillin, chloramphenicol,
ciproﬂoxacin, doxycycline, erythromycin, gentamicin, streptomycin and sulfonamides also can be used,
but their effectiveness in comparison with penicillin and the tetracyclines has not been evaluated under
ﬁeld conditions.
3.1.4.4. Article 7(d)(iv) Biosecurity measures
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available biosecurity measures
The measures required to reach the maximum level of ‘biosafety’ are not necessarily the same as
those needed to reach the maximum level of ‘biosecurity’. To achieve this last one, suitable measures
must be adopted, like controlled access and barriers to laboratories, security measures on the
personnel employed, strict procedures for the transportation or traceability of biological agents within
Table 6: Types of drugs available on the market for humans
Drug
Method of
Administration
Effectiveness
Production capacity
(per year)
Penicillin G
procaine
Oral, intravenous Bactericidal agents
(inhibition of the enzymes topoisomerase II
(DNA gyrase) and topoisomerase IV (both Type
II topoisomerases), which are required for
bacterial DNA replication, transcription, repair,
and recombination)
Data not available
Ciproﬂoxacin Oral, intravenous Bactericidal agents
(inhibition of the enzymes topoisomerase II
(DNA gyrase) and topoisomerase IV (both Type
II topoisomerases), which are required for
bacterial DNA replication, transcription, repair,
and recombination)
Data not available
Doxycycline Oral, intravenous Protein synthesis inhibitor Data not available
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and most of all outside the laboratory, to avoid the loss or theft of the preserved agents and toxins.
These activities involve checks, and therefore regulations and restrictions, not only locally, but also
nationally and internationally. Therefore it seems crucial, in order to reach the highest level of
‘biosecurity’, to know which potential dual-use agents are used in the various laboratories, in which
quantity, their exact location, their movements and how they are used for positive purposes. Clinical
specimens and cultures of B. anthracis should be handled at biosafety level 3. Vaccination of
laboratory personnel is recommended. Protection for veterinarians and other animal handlers involves
wearing gloves, and other protective clothing when handling specimens from suspected anthrax
carcasses and never rubbing the face or eyes. The risk of gastrointestinal anthrax may arise if
individuals eat meat from animals infected with anthrax. The risk of inhaling infectious doses becomes
signiﬁcant in occupations involving the processing of animal by products for manufacturing goods
(industrial anthrax). These include the tanning, woollen, animal hair, carpet, bone processing and other
such industries, where the potential for aerosolisation of substantial numbers of spores increases the
risk of exposure to infectious doses. It is important that industrial workers use appropriate personal
protective clothing and equipment and follow standard operating procedures that minimise the risk of
transmission. Efﬁcient air extraction equipment should be positioned over picking, combing, carding
and spinning machines. Air blowing machinery should never be used for cleaning equipment due to
the risk of spore dispersal (OIE, 2012).
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of biosecurity measures in preventing the pathogen introduction
Biosecurity measures have proved to be very effective in avoiding the bacteria introduction.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of biosecurity measure
All biosecurity measures are easily achievable and must be performed by personnel who work in
contact with infected or potentially infected animals.
In case of animal anthrax outbreak, it is necessary a proper handling of the dead subjects and of
those potentially infected. In many countries, the staff at risk (veterinarians, butchers, shearers,
breeders) are not vaccinated and therefore they should follow the following instructions:
• Do not touch the carcass of animals with bare hands.
• In the case of very hairy animals, avoid disturbing hair that can become airborne and be
inhaled (the hairs are often the vehicle of spores). In this case, wetting the dead animal’s body
with formalin or peracetic acid may help to reduce the spores in the environment and reduce
the dispersion of the hair.
• Wear two pairs of gloves, Tyvec jumpsuit with a hood, masks with ﬁlters from 0.45 m, plastic
shoes.
• In the case of live animals and animal suspected of infection.
• Do not touch the animals with bare hands during the temperature control step, blood sampling
and vaccination.
• Always wear at least two pairs of gloves, Tyvec jumpsuit with a hood, masks with ﬁlters from
0.45 m, plastic shoes.
• Take the blood sample in a controlled way to minimise the risk of self-injury (needle stick injury).
In all cases, the operator will undress (with assistance) after the procedure, and all protective
layers will be destroyed immediately by burning (on location).
3.1.4.5. Article 7(d)(v) Restrictions on the movement of animals and products
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available movement restriction measures
Anthrax is a disease whose clinical course is very rapid and often the animals are found dead in the
barn or on pasture. In the event of an outbreak affecting grazing animals (animal found dead on the
pastures), the animals should be immediately brought into the stable and further movements avoided.
The animals must be immediately vaccinated. Before vaccination, it is necessary to check the body
temperature and, if this is regular, the ﬁrst vaccination should be made. In the case in which the body
temperature is not regular (fever), then the animals must be isolated and treated in advance with
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antibiotic therapy. Vaccination should then be performed after not less than 1 week since the last
antibiotic treatment. A booster vaccination is recommended 14 days after the ﬁrst vaccination. Animals
can be moved again not earlier than 10 days after the second vaccination intervention.
In the event of an outbreak affecting tethering animals (stabled), it is recommended not to allow
any movement. The forage being fed must be suspected and thus it should be replaced with
alternative forage of a different origin. The animals must be immediately vaccinated. Before
vaccination, it is necessary to check the body temperature and, if this is regular, the ﬁrst vaccination
should be made. In the case in which the body temperature is not regular (fever), the animals must
be isolated and treated in advance with antibiotic therapy. Vaccination should then be performed after
not less than 1 week since the last antibiotic treatment. In any case, a booster vaccination protocol
which foresees a reminder 14 days after the ﬁrst vaccination is necessary. Animals can be moved
again not earlier than 10 days after the second vaccination intervention.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of restriction of animal movement in preventing the between farm spread
The implementation of restriction control measures on animal movements and their products,
during an infectious outbreak or epidemic, effectively prevents further transmission of the pathogen or
new outbreaks of the disease.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of restriction of animal movement
The underpinning of the disease control programme is an effective surveillance system that
provides guidance on priorities and targets for the application of interventions. Restriction measures of
animal movement is possible through programmes of vaccination in the affected area, avoid producing
and exporting crop soils with high levels of contamination by anthrax spores and reduce animal
movements to the site where the outbreak occurred.
3.1.4.6. Article 7(d)(vi) Killing of animals
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available methods for killing animal
Anthrax in animals usually shows a rapid progression with a fatal outcome, so often it is not
necessary to kill the animals. It is a very rare event to observe a ruminant in preagonal phase of the
disease. However, the preagonal phase of the disease can sometimes be observed in equines affected
by anthrax since the course of the disease is slightly longer in equines. Animals generally express in
the preagonal phase very serious respiratory symptoms.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of killing animals (at farm level or within the farm) for reducing/stopping
spread of the disease
Culling and killing is necessary just in order to avoid suffering in infected animals.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of killing animals
Where possible, the dead or killed animal must be moved and placed on a ﬂoor covered with a
durable plastic sheet and subjected to decontaminating treatment. Operators carrying out these
operations will necessarily have to take the personal protection measures described above.
3.1.4.7. Article 7(d)(vii) Disposal of carcasses and other relevant animal by-products
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available disposal option
The primary source of environmental contamination of anthrax spores is from the carcasses of
animals that have died of anthrax. To prevent sporulation, carcasses should not be opened. Carcasses
should be disposed of intact and the preferred methods used in most countries that practice this
method are:
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• Burial
• Treatment of carcasses with 10% formalin
• Incineration
• Rendering (effective controlled heat treatment)
In the case of burial (and possibly burning also), consideration may be given to spraying the
carcasses and the surrounding ground with 10% formalin to minimise the number of spores which
may survive and resurface, presenting infection risk sometimes in the future (Bengis and Frean, 2014).
Consideration might be given to treating anthrax carcasses with 10% formalin or 1% peracetic acid
leaving them in situ for some days before disposal while natural putrefaction processes within the
carcass kill the vegetative anthrax organisms. The formalin would have the action of killing anthrax
organisms shed by the dead animal, preserving the skin so that it retains the anaerobic environment
within the putrefying carcass. It may also deter scavengers that would otherwise open up the carcass
and thereby increase the contamination, and ﬂies that might spread the disease. Rendering is
essentially a cooking process that results in sterilisation of raw materials of animal origin such those
parts of carcasses that may be utilised safely for subsequent commercial purposes. In general, the raw
materials are ﬁnely chopped and then passed into a steam-heated chamber and subjected to
temperatures ranging from 100 to 150°C for 10–60 min (this does not include the time taken to bring
the material to the peak temperature or the subsequent cooling period time).
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of disposal option
Burial
Periodic reports of viable anthrax spores at burial sites of animals that died many years before
support the unreliability of burial procedures for long-term control of the disease. Further
disadvantages of burial sites are that scavengers may dig down to reach the carcass, and in dry dusty
areas, the digging process can spread the contaminated soil extensively. Furthermore, in raising the
pH of the soil, addition of lime when burying anthrax carcasses may actually be counterproductive to
minimising long-term spore contamination. In summary, burial should be discouraged in favour of
incineration.
Incineration
Incineration must be carried out with appropriate care to ensure complete burning from beneath.
The down directed blow-torch is an alternative incineration procedure that ensures severe scorching of
the soil to several centimetres of depth. The spores will be conﬁned to where the blood has been shed
through the body oriﬁces and will mostly be in the soil beneath these points. Relatively few spore
forms, therefore, will enter the ﬁre and updraft; vegetative forms will almost certainly not survive. If
concern persists, consideration might be given to pre-treating the carcass and associated
contaminated soil with 10% formalin a few hours before incineration to minimise the number of
present viable spores.
Rendering
The rendering procedure requires the correct performance of each of three stages: collection,
transport and treatment of the carcass. These should be supervised by veterinary authorities. It is
necessary that the carcass should be bagged and the bag, collection machinery, materials and tools, and
the carcass site itself appropriately decontaminated and disinfected. Before heat treatment, carcasses
should be broken down into pieces not larger than 10 cm3. In the case of anthrax carcasses, this should
be done with very careful attention to hygiene during the process, with the necessary disinfection and
decontamination of the rendering premises, tools, clothing, waste run-off, etc. Controlled heat-treatment
is then carried out with temperature, pressure and time of sterilisation recorded.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of disposal option
The choice of one or more of the recommended methods should be in compliance with relevant
local and national legislation and should be attainable with the resources available. In some developing
country situations where burial, incineration or rendering is not feasible, the last resort may be to
leave the carcass unmoved in situ and ensure that it is inaccessible to other animals, particularly
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scavengers, or people. This is achieved by covering with tarpaulins, branches of trees, corrugated iron
or other available materials. Hazard signs should be posted around sites in this case. This again allows
the putrefactive process to take effect, although residual environmental contamination may still
remain, and either the site should be scorched after putrefaction is complete or it should be treated
with 10% formalin. Alternatively, it should be made inaccessible to other animals indeﬁnitely by
fencing, capping with concrete or other impervious material, covering with brushwood, or growing
impenetrable undergrowth.
3.1.5. Article 7(e) The impact of disease prevention and control measures
3.1.5.1. Article 7(e)(i) The direct and indirect costs for the affected sectors and the
economy as a whole
Parameter 1 – Cost of control (e.g. treatment/vaccine, biosecurity)
Not calculable, not deﬁnable. It is hypothesised more than one million dollars (US) in the world.
Parameter 2 – Cost of eradication (culling, compensation)
Not calculable, not deﬁnable. These costs include the expenses of the cost of vaccine and
personnel for vaccination campaigns. In areas at risk it is recommended to vaccinate for 10 years.
Parameter 3 – Cost of surveillance and monitoring
Not calculable, not deﬁnable.
Parameter 4 – Trade loss (bans, embargoes, sanctions) by animal product
Not calculable, not deﬁnable.
Parameter 5 – Importance of the disease for the affected sector (% loss or € lost compared to
business amount of the sector
Not calculable, not deﬁnable.
3.1.5.2. Article 7(e)(ii) The societal acceptance of disease prevention and control
measures
As for any infectious disease, the outbreaks or individual cases (both animal and human) of anthrax
logically trigger concern in society. After the anthrax attack in 2001 in USA, during which some letters
containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media ofﬁces and two Democratic US Senators
killing ﬁve people and infecting 17 others, many things have changed. Obviously this event changed
the perceived risk. The control measures (animal vaccination, movement control of animals) have not
a big impact on society.
3.1.5.3. Article 7(e)(iii) The welfare of affected subpopulations of kept and wild animals
In the affected subpopulations, the concern is for the surviving animals. Both in kept and wild
animals, surviving animals are vaccinated so that they can graze. Following the vaccination, adverse
reactions may occur in the animals.
Parameter 1 – Welfare impact of control measures on domestic animals
There is potential for vaccine reaction in vaccinated animals.
Parameter 2 – Wildlife depopulation as control measure
Data not available.
3.1.5.4. Article 7(e)(iv) The environment and biodiversity
Environment
Parameter 1 – Use and potential residuals of biocides or medical drugs in environmental compartments
(soil, water, feed, manure)
The biocides (sterilising methods based on peracetic acid, sodium hypochlorite, formalin) can be
used in proximity to burial sites where animals which died of anthrax are buried.
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Biodiversity
Parameter 2 – Mortality in wild species
Data not available.
3.2. Assessment according to Article 5 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Article 5 of the AHL
about anthrax (Table 7). The expert judgement was based on Individual and Collective Behavioural
Aggregation (ICBA) approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology (EFSA AHAW
Panel, 2017). Experts have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped into
Article 5 criteria (see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or
‘na’ judgement on each criterion of Article 5, and the reasoning supporting their judgement.
The minimum number of judges in the judgement was 13. The expert judgement was conducted
as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). For details on the interpretation
of the questions see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
3.2.1. Non-consensus questions
This section displays the assessment related to each criterion of Article 5 where no consensus was
achieved in form of tables (Table 8). The proportion of Y, N or na answers are reported, followed by
the list of different supporting views for each answer.
Table 7: Outcome of the expert judgement on the Article 5 criteria for anthrax
Criteria to be met by the disease:
According to AHL, a disease shall be included in the list referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 of
Article 5 if it has been assessed in accordance with Article 7 and meets all of the following
criteria
Final
outcome
A(i) The disease is transmissible Y
A(ii) Animal species are either susceptible to the disease or vectors and reservoirs thereof
exist in the Union
Y
A(iii) The disease causes negative effects on animal health or poses a risk to public health due
to its zoonotic character
Y
A(iv) Diagnostic tools are available for the disease Y
A(v) Risk-mitigating measures and, where relevant, surveillance of the disease are effective
and proportionate to the risks posed by the disease in the Union
Y
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point A(i)–A(v), the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
B(i) The disease causes or could cause signiﬁcant negative effects in the Union on animal
health, or poses or could pose a signiﬁcant risk to public health due to its zoonotic
character
Y
B(ii) The disease agent has developed resistance to treatments and poses a signiﬁcant danger
to public and/or animal health in the Union
NC
B(iii) The disease causes or could cause a signiﬁcant negative economic impact affecting
agriculture or aquaculture production in the Union
N
B(iv) The disease has the potential to generate a crisis or the disease agent could be used for
the purpose of bioterrorism
Y
B(v) The disease has or could have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the environment,
including biodiversity, of the Union
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), yellow = no consensus (NC).
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Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes:
• Insurgence of resistance to treatment has been documented in at least two ﬁeld surveys, e.g.
resistance to penicillin in < 1% of strains.
• In vitro studies have shown that B. anthracis strains can develop resistance to a wide range of
antibiotics.
• Any resistance would pose signiﬁcant dangers to people and animals, i.e. increase mortality
rates.
Supporting No:
• Resistance of B. anthracis strains is not considered to signiﬁcantly pose a public health risk,
and there have been no cases in humans where treatment failed because of resistance of
B. anthracis.
3.2.2. Outcome of the assessment of anthrax according to criteria of Article 5(3)
of the AHL on its eligibility to be listed
As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article
5 if it fulﬁls all criteria of the ﬁrst set from A(i) to A(v) and at least one of the second set of criteria
from B(i) to B(v). According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is
considered fulﬁlled when the outcome is ‘Yes’. According to the results shown in Table 7, anthrax
complies with all criteria of the ﬁrst set and with two criteria of the second set, therefore it is
considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article 5 of the AHL.
3.3. Assessment according to Article 9 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Annex IV referring to
categories as in Article 9 of the AHL about anthrax (Tables 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13). The expert
judgement was based on ICBA approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology.
Experts have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped into Article 9 criteria
(see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or ‘na’ judgement
on each criterion of Article 9, and the reasoning supporting their judgement.
The minimum number of judges in the judgement was 13. The expert judgement was conducted
as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). For details on the interpretation
of the questions see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
Table 8: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 5 B(ii)
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
B(ii) The disease agent has developed resistance to treatments and
poses a signiﬁcant danger to public and/or animal health in the
Union
NC 92 8 0
NC: non-consensus; number of judges: 13.
Table 9: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of Section 1 of Annex IV
(category A of Article 9) for anthrax
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is not present in the territory of the Union OR present only in exceptional
cases (irregular introductions) OR present in only in a very limited part of the territory
of the Union
NC
2.1 The disease is highly transmissible N
2.2 There be possibilities of airborne or waterborne or vector-borne spread Y
2.3 The disease affects multiple species of kept and wild animals OR single species of kept
animals of economic importance
Y
2.4 The disease may result in high morbidity and signiﬁcant mortality rates Y
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At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at points 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health,
including epidemic or pandemic potential OR possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
N
4(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
4(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
5(a)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(a)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(b)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(b)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(c)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
5(d)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), yellow = no consensus (NC).
Table 10: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of Section 2 of Annex IV
(category B of Article 9) for anthrax
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory with an endemic
character AND (at the same time) several Member States or zones of the Union are free
of the disease
NC
2.1 The disease is moderately to highly transmissible Y
2.2 There be possibilities of airborne or waterborne or vector-borne spread Y
2.3 The disease affects single or multiple species Y
2.4 The disease may result in high morbidity with in general low mortality N
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at points 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health,
including epidemic potential OR possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
N
4(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
4(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
5(a)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(a)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(b)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
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5(b)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(c)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
5(d)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), yellow = no consensus (NC).
Table 11: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of Section 3 of Annex IV
(category C of Article 9) for anthrax
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory with an endemic
character
NC
2.1 The disease is moderately to highly transmissible Y
2.2 The disease is transmitted mainly by direct or indirect transmission Y
2.3 The disease affects single or multiple species Y
2.4 The disease usually does not result in high morbidity and has negligible or no mortality
AND often the most observed effect of the disease is production loss
N
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at points 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health, or
possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
NC
4(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, mainly related to its
direct impact on certain types of animal production systems
N
4(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, mainly related to its
direct impact on certain types of animal production systems
N
5(a)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(a)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
N
5(b)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(b)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(c)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d)(CI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
5(d)(PI) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), yellow = no consensus (NC).
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3.3.1. Non-consensus questions
This section displays the assessment related to each criterion of Annex IV referring to the
categories of Article 9 of the AHL where no consensus was achieved in form of tables (Tables 14 and
15). The proportion of Y, N or ‘na’ answers are reported, followed by the list of different supporting
views for each answer.
Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes for 1 (cat.A):
• The spores are present in the soil in some areas of the EU, but the disease occurs only
sporadically, with the results that there are unlikely to be actively infected animals at all times in
the MSs. Anthrax does however retain the potential to generate periodic disease cases over long
periods of time.
Supporting Yes for 1 (cat.B):
• B. anthracis spores are very persistent in the environment, and can remain viable for hundreds
of years (De Vos, 1990). Several MSs have been free from the disease for several years,
however they cannot demonstrate freedom from the pathogen.
Table 12: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of Section 4 of Annex IV
(category D of Article 9) for anthrax
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
D The risk posed by the disease in question can be effectively and proportionately mitigated by
measures concerning movements of animals and products in order to prevent or limit its
occurrence and spread
Y
the disease fulﬁls criteria of Sections 1, 2, 3 or 5 of Annex IV of AHL Y
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No).
Table 13: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of Section 5 of Annex IV
(category E of Article 9) for anthrax
Diseases in category E need to fulﬁl criteria of Sections 1, 2 or 3 of Annex IV of AHL and/or the
following:
Final
outcome
E Surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating to animal health, animal welfare,
human health, the economy, society or the environment (If a disease fulﬁls the criteria as in
Article 5, thus being eligible to be listed, consequently category E would apply.)
Y
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No).
Table 14: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 1 of Article 9
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y
(%)
N
(%)
na
(%)
1(cat.A) The disease is not present in the territory of the Union OR present
only in exceptional cases (irregular introductions) OR present in
only in a very limited part of the territory of the Union
NC 46 54 0
1(cat.B) The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory
with an endemic character AND (at the same time) several
Member States or zones of the Union are free of the disease
NC 31 69 0
1(cat.C) The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory
with an endemic character
NC 8 92 0
NC: non-consensus; number of judges: 13.
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Supporting Yes for 1 (cat.C):
• Where spores are present, anthrax can occur anywhere in the EU without an external
introduction of the pathogen.
Supporting No for 1 (cat.A,B,C):
• Spores are likely to be present in limited areas in almost all MSs, but the disease is rare. No
MS is documented free. None of the categories can apply here.
Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes for 3:
• Even one single fatal human case of anthrax would lead to signiﬁcant consequences on public
health. Epidemics/pandemics seem very unlikely.
• Eating contaminated meat poses a threat to public health.
• There may be a risk for farmers as they can be exposed.
Supporting No for 3:
• If the use for bioterrorism purposes is not considered here (it is tackled in a speciﬁc criterion
and anthrax should be dealt with as a bioterrorist threat with clearly signiﬁcant consequences
on public health, epidemic or even potential pandemic implications), the signiﬁcant
consequences or threats to food safety are unlikely, since anthrax may lead to sporadic cases,
even deaths in groups of animals but neither to signiﬁcant human health problems nor to food
safety issues from a normal control perspective, nor epidemics nor pandemics and thus it
would not be routine problem requiring a high level of routine control.
3.3.2. Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for anthrax for the
purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL
As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered to ﬁt in a certain category (A, B, C, D or
E corresponding to point (a) to point (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL) if it is eligible to be listed for Union
intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) and fulﬁls all criteria of the ﬁrst set from 1 to 2.4 and at least
one of the second set of criteria from 3 to 5(d) as shown in Tables 9–13. According to the assessment
methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is considered fulﬁlled when the outcome is ‘Yes’.
A description of the outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for anthrax for the purpose
of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL is presented in Table 16.
Table 15: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 3 of Article 9
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
3(cat.C) The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant
consequences on public health, or possible signiﬁcant threats
to food safety
NC 92 8 0
NC: non-consensus; number of judges: 13.
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According to the assessment here performed, anthrax complies with the following criteria of the
Sections 1 to 5 of Annex IV of the AHL for the application of the disease prevention and control rules
referred to in points (a) to (e) of Article 9(1):
1) To be assigned to category A, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
(1, 2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment anthrax complies with criteria 2.2, 2.3 and
2.4, but not with criterion 2.1 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with
criterion 1. To be eligible for category A, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of
the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a–d) and anthrax does not comply with any of them.
2) To be assigned to category B, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
(1, 2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment anthrax complies with criteria 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3, but not with criterion 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with
criterion 1. To be eligible for category B, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of
the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a–d) and anthrax does not comply with any of them.
3) To be assigned to category C, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
(1, 2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment anthrax complies with criteria 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3, but not with criterion 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with
criterion 1. To be eligible for category C, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of
the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a–d) and anthrax does not comply with criteria 4, 5a,
5b, 5c and 5d and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criterion 3.
4) To be assigned to category D, a disease needs to comply with criteria of Section 1, 2, 3 or 5 of
Annex IV of the AHL and with the speciﬁc criterion D of Section 4, with which anthrax
complies.
5) To be assigned to category E, a disease needs to comply with criteria of Section 1, 2 or 3 of
Annex IV of the AHL and/or the surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating to
animal health, animal welfare, human health, the economy, society or the environment. The
latter is applicable if a disease fulﬁls the criteria as in Article 5, with which anthrax complies.
3.4. Assessment of Article 8
This section presents the results of the assessment on the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL about
anthrax. The Article 8(3) criteria are about animal species to be listed, as it reads below:
Table 16: Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for anthrax for the purpose of
categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL
Category
Article 9 criteria
1° set of criteria 2° set of criteria
1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3 4 5a 5b 5c 5d
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‘3. Animal species or groups of animal species shall be added to this list if they are affected or if
they pose a risk for the spread of a speciﬁc listed disease because:
a) they are susceptible for a speciﬁc listed disease or scientiﬁc evidence indicates that such
susceptibility is likely; or
b) they are vector species or reservoirs for that disease, or scientiﬁc evidence indicates that
such role is likely’.
For this reason, the assessment on Article 8 criteria is based on the evidence as extrapolated from
the relevant criteria of Article 7, i.e. the ones related to susceptible and reservoir species or routes of
transmission, which cover also possible role of biological or mechanical vectors.1 According to the
mapping, as presented in Table 5, Section 3.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology
(EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), the main animal species to be listed for anthrax according to the criteria of
Article 8(3) of the AHL are as displayed in Table 17.
4. Conclusions
TOR 1: for each of those diseases an assessment, following the criteria laid down in Article 7 of
the AHL, on its eligibility of being listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL;
Table 17: Main animal species to be listed for anthrax according to criteria of Article 8 (source:
data reported in Section 3.1.1.1)
Class Order Family Genus/Species
Susceptible Mammalia Artiodactyla Bovidae Bos taurus, Bison bison, Ovis aries,
Capra aegagrus, Damaliscus pygargus
phillipsi
Cervidae Unspeciﬁed
Suidae Sus scrofa
Perissodactyla Equidae Equus caballus
Rhinocerotidae Unspeciﬁed
Proboscidea Elephantidae Unspeciﬁed
Carnivora Ursidae Unspeciﬁed
Felidae Unspeciﬁed
Mustelidae Unspeciﬁed
Canidae Unspeciﬁed
Procyonidae Unspeciﬁed
Viverridae Unspeciﬁed
Eupleridae Unspeciﬁed
Mephitidae Unspeciﬁed
Rodentia Muridae Rattus, Mus
Caviidae Cavia porcellus
Lagomorpha Leporidae Unspeciﬁed
Diprotodontia Unspeciﬁed
Primates Unspeciﬁed Unspeciﬁed
Aves Gruiformes Gruidae Unspeciﬁed
Anseriformes Anatidae Unspeciﬁed
Struthioniformes Struthionidae Unspeciﬁed
Reptilia Testudines Testudinidae Unspeciﬁed
Reservoir None
Vectors None
1 A vector is a living organism that transmits an infectious agent from an infected animal to a human or another animal. Vectors
are frequently arthropods. Biological vectors may carry pathogens that can multiply or/and undergo transformations within
their bodies and be delivered to new hosts, usually by biting. In mechanical vectors the pathogens do neither multiply nor
transform within the vector, which usually remains infected for shorter time than in biological vectors.
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• According to the assessment here performed, anthrax complies with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
and with two criteria of the second set and therefore can be considered eligible to be listed for
Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL.
TOR 2a: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, an
assessment of its compliance with each of the criteria in Annex IV to the AHL for the purpose of
categorisation of diseases in accordance with Article 9 of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, anthrax meets the criteria as in Sections 4 and 5
of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred
to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL.
TOR 2b: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, a list
of animal species that should be considered candidates for listing in accordance with Article 8 of the
AHL.
• According to the assessment here performed, the susceptible animal species that can be
considered to be listed for anthrax according to Article 8(3) of the AHL are several species of
mammals, birds and reptiles, as reported in Table 17 in Section 3.4 of the present document.
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Abbreviations
AHAW EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare
AHL Animal Health Law
AVA Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
AVP Anthrax Vaccine Precipitated
BA blood agar
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFSPH Center for Food Security and Public Health
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
DALY Disability-adjusted life year
ELISA enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
FDA Food and Drug Administration
GABRI Ground Anthrax Bacillus Reﬁned Isolation
ICBA Individual and Collective Behavioural Aggregation
IgG immunoglobulin G
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
MALDI-TOF matrix assisted laser desorption ionization-time of ﬂight
MS Member State
OIE World Organization for Animal Health
PA protective antigen
PCR polymerase chain reaction
PEP post-exposure prophylaxis
PLET polymyxin lysozyme EDTA thallous acetate
TNA toxin neutralising assay
ToR Terms of Reference
TSMP trimethoprim sulfamethoxazole methanol polymyxin
TV trivalent vaccine
WAHID World Animal health information database
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